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ABSTRACT 
A consideration of TFP growth in the United States during the golden age 
(1948-73) raises two related questions:  on the one hand why was it so strong and 
on the other hand, why were TFP growth rates lower than they were during the 
Depression years (1929-41)?  A continuing downward trend in TFP growth within 
manufacturing, and its declining share after World War II, help provide answers to 
the latter question.  A persisting productivity windfall associated with the build out 
of the surface road infrastructure helps answer the former question.   By adopting a 
longer historical perspective, we can move beyond understanding the golden age sui 
generis, and begin to see it instead as a period reflecting the persistence of trends 
and developments whose origins are to be found prior to the Second World War.   
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Introduction. 
The quarter century running from 1948 through 1973 is generally recognized as the 
golden age of U.S. productivity growth. Over these years output per hour in the private 
nonfarm economy grew at a compound annual average rate of 2.88 percent per year.  The 
distinctiveness of this achievement, and its implications for the U.S. material standard of 
living, is reflected in the fact that the long run growth rate of U.S. output for over a 
century has been approximately 3 percent per year.   
Of this 2.88 percent, approximately 1 percentage point per year can be attributed to 
the effects of capital deepening associated with the revival of private sector physical 
capital accumulation following its cessation after 1929.  Net private investment was 
negative during the Depression years, and although accumulation revived after 1941, it 
was only after the war that it could do so in a fashion less distorted by the demands of 
war. The remainder of growth in output per hour between 1948 and 1973, 1.90 percent 
per year, reflected an increase in total factor productivity.   
The purpose of this paper is to examine the sources of this advance in the light of a 
revised narrative of twentieth century U.S. economic growth that places the Depression 
years in a more prominent position than they have heretofore occupied.  Between 1929 
and 1941 TFP in the private nonfarm economy grew at an unadjusted rate of 2.31 percent 
per year, the highest peak to peacetime peak rate of the century. If one makes a cyclical 
adjustment for the level of productivity in 1941, the TFP growth rate over this 12 year 
period rises to 2.78 percent per year.  Output per hour grew more slowly than during the 
golden age because of the absence of net private sector capital deepening.  But the 
difference comparing the two periods is remarkably small - only .45 percentage points 
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per year using unadjusted 1941 data and barely two one hundreds of a percentage point 
using adjusted data.1   
While unemployment remained at double digit levels until 1941, an expansion of 
potential output largely unrecognized at the time helps explains how the United States 
was able to wage an equipment intensive war, put over 12 million individuals in the 
active duty military, and, by some measures, increase consumption over Depression 
levels in spite of rationing and the unavailability of some goods during the war.  Another 
way of understanding the magnitude of the increase in potential output is this.  Between 
1929 and 1941 the input of hours into the private nonfarm economy was basically 
unchanged; and the private capital stock actually declined.  But output was 32 percent 
higher in 1941 (Kendrick, 1961).  Thus all of the increase in output, and all of the growth 
in output per hour over this twelve year period, is attributable to the residual 
This new emphasis on the Depression’s contribution to growth of potential output is 
a prism through which the experiences of the rest of the century are refracted in new 
ways.  It places the achievements of the 1920s and the 1990s in a different light.  It 
overturns the conventional wisdom attributing achieved 1948 productivity levels 
principally to the war (Field, 2007b).  And – the thesis of this paper -- the golden age 
(1948-73) no longer has to be understood sui generis, but can be seen as a period 
reflecting the extension and persistence of trends and technological foundations 
established during the interwar period.   
What were these trends?  The first was a continuing decline in the rate of advance 
of TFP within the manufacturing sector.  The second was the persistence of high rates of 
                                                 
1 Because total factor productivity growth was strongly procyclical between 1929 and 1941, the adjustment 
raises the estimated level of full employment TFP in 1941, and thus its rate of growth over the twelve year 
period.  For details, see Field (2007b). 
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TFP growth in transportation, communication, public utilities, and trade.  In both the 
1930s and the golden age, these sectors benefited from complementary investments in 
government infrastructure.  The 1930s saw a very high rate of street and highway 
expenditure, in which the paved highway network of the US caught up with the rapid 
expansion of automobile and truck production during the 1920s.  This allowed the 
emergence of a transformed system of moving goods that involved an integration of rails 
for long haul and trucks for local and regional distribution.   These changes underlay 
extremely high rates of TFP advance in trucking and warehousing and to a lesser degree 
railroads during the Depression years and the persistence of advance in these sectors 
during the postwar period (Field, 2006a). 
Manufacturing 
Much attention has been focused on the revolution in manufacturing productivity 
during the 1920s, and rightly so.  Between 1919 and 1929, TFP in the sector grew at 5.12 
percent continuously compounded, accounting for 84 percent of the growth of the 
residual in the entire private non-farm economy (Kendrick, 1961; Field, 2006a).  If there 
was ever a period that warrants the sometimes excessive attention devoted to this sector 
by economists, the 1920s certainly qualifies.   
The fundamental cause was a revolution in factory design and the distribution of 
power within it associated with a shift from steam (or in a few cases, still, water) power 
to electric power.  Because of square – cube relationships involving cost savings 
associated with larger boilers and pistons, a single large steam engine as prime mover 
was almost always the economically attractive option for a fixed installation.  In a steam 
powered factory motive force was generated centrally and distributed to work stations by 
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means of a mechanical system of leather belts, pulleys, and rotating horizontal shafts.  
The economics of factory design required balancing the increased cost per square foot of 
multistory designs with the imperative to minimize the sum of runs from the prime mover 
to individual work stations, so as to keep a lid on the substantial power losses attributable 
to friction when mechanical transmission was used.  
The fact that power driven factories in the nineteenth century were typically two, 
three, four, or five stories tall was not generally the result of high urban land values.  This 
was obviously so in the case of water power, which dominated mechanized factories in 
the antebellum period.  The early textile cities such as Lowell and Lawrence, 
Massachusetts or Manchester, New Hampshire were greenfield sites.  Water held on 
tenaciously in New England (in 1900 over 35 percent of the horsepower in the region was 
still generated by these means), but steam came to predominate elsewhere in the country, 
a development facilitated by advances in high pressure engineering and the development 
of large, powerful, and energy efficient engines such as the Corliss (Atack, Bateman, and 
Weiss, 1980; Rosenberg and Trajtenberg, 2001). The prime mover in a steam powered 
factory was typically housed in its own room, with a leather belt, often several feet wide 
and several hundred feet long, connecting the flywheel to the main drive shaft. Although 
use of steam power allowed location of new factories closer to existing supplies of labor 
and transport facilities, the basic design of a plant remained fundamentally unchanged, 
and its height was driven by the same considerations involving the internal distribution of 
power as had dictated its profile in the age of water.     
Thus for both water and steam powered plants,  the multistory factory building of 
the nineteenth century was the result of a different economic imperative than that which 
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pushed up the height of commercial office structures in central business districts.   The 
most persuasive evidence for this is what happened in the twentieth century.  With 
electrification, and the eventual elimination of the old internal system for distributing 
power, factories went predominantly single story, even though the population of the U.S. 
was larger and more concentrated, so in principle land was scarcer (more flexible surface 
transportation associated with the diffusion of the internal combustion engine and related 
infrastructure also played a role in this transition). To a very considerable degree, 
multistory factory construction in the nineteenth century reflected an engineering solution 
to the problem of distributing power mechanically from a central prime mover.   
The first factory electrification (for power rather than illumination) involved simply 
replacing one large prime mover with another.  The steam engine was removed and an 
electric engine substituted – but there were no changes in the mechanisms for distributing 
power mechanically within the factory.   It took several decades for factory designers and 
electrical engineers fully to appreciate how, using a few large power generating plants 
and a multitude of smaller electric motors, they could dispense with the onsite prime 
mover and the apparatus for mechanically distributing power, replacing the latter with a 
network of relatively cheap and flexible electric wires.   An intermediate step (group 
drive) involved use of medium sized motors to turn somewhat shorter drive shafts that in 
turn supplied power to groups of machines (Devine, 1983).    
The change in the way in which power was distributed removed a straightjacket 
from factory design, allowing one story layouts and a reconfiguration of internal work 
flow that went hand in hand with the diffusion of assembly line techniques in such 
industries as transport equipment and electrical machinery.   There are many features 
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distinguishing twentieth century factory buildings from those constructed in the 
nineteenth, but the most salient is that the twentieth century structure, like Ford’s River 
Rouge facility, is single storied, whereas the nineteenth century factory was not.  Single 
storied buildings had lower construction costs per square foot, but there were other 
advantages, particularly in industries based on mechanical or electrical engineering that 
required the assembly of many parts.  The best way to engineer an assembly line, except 
in the few instances where gravity can be harnessed to particularly good effect, it to keep 
it on a single level.  A bonus was reduced risk of fire.  Multistory factories with 
mechanical power distribution required openings between floors so that power could be 
transferred across drive shafts on different floors.  These openings created natural 
avenues through which fire could spread, entailing higher fire insurance premiums and/or 
the costs of enclosures to mitigate the risk (Devine, 1983, p. 361). 
Electrical internal power distribution and the use of small electric motors made all 
floor areas of the factory – not just those close to an overhead shaft – of roughly 
equivalent economic value.  In the steam powered factory there was prime real estate 
near the overhead shafts and there were “dead” areas that could be used only for storage.  
Such areas could now also be used for stages of the manufacturing process.  The 
dismantling or elimination of the mechanical system for distributing power internally, 
which had required brackets and rotating drive shafts hanging from the ceiling, made it 
much easier to install overhead cranes for moving subassemblies.   The possibility of 
using portable tools powered by electricity was another contributor to productivity 
advance.  Finally, new single storied buildings could utilize skylights for illumination and 
ventilation – a rare feature in a nineteenth century factory. 
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It was during the 1920s that much of this transition took place, and the decade is 
unique in the history of U.S. manufacturing.  TFP growth rates in manufacturing were 
extremely high, and this was true across the board at the two digit level (Kendrick, 1961; 
Field, 2006a).   The profits associated with this transition played a major role in fueling 
the stock market boom between 1925 and 1929. 
As a result of this revolution in factory design, layout, and internal power 
distribution, the level of TFP in U.S. manufacturing was higher in all subsequent periods.  
But one of the lessons learned from analysis of the Solow model is that it is far easier to 
raise the trajectory of levels of productivity in a sector or economy than it is to 
permanently increase productivity growth rates.  Of course, whenever levels increase 
there will be a transition in which the rate of growth will accelerate.  But the higher rates, 
whether due to a rising saving rate or to the availability of new technologies, usually 
cannot be sustained.   
And so it was in this case. U.S. manufacturing could not hope to sustain a rate of 
increase of TFP of over 5 percent per year in perpetuity from the electrification/ assembly 
line/ one story transition.  Eventually, as old factories were reconfigured, and as new 
factories replaced old, there would be fewer and fewer opportunities to reap additional 
gains. As Devine shows, the transition from steam to electric power, which began around 
the turn of the century, and accelerated after the First World War, was largely complete 
by the end of the 1920s.  By 1929, electricity was responsible for driving about 79 
percent of total capacity within U.S. manufacturing (Devine, 1983, p. 349).   
From this perspective, the puzzle is not so much why manufacturing TFP growth 
declined from 5.12 percent per year (1919-29) to 2.60 percent per year between 1929 and 
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1941 (Field, 2006a) as why it did not fall further.  There are two considerations that help 
explain why.  The first reflects the residual influences – the tail end -- of the 
electrification transition.  In some cases, as Bresnahan and Raff have shown for the 
automobile industry, some older and less productive plants that had persisted in operation 
during the boom period of the 1920s simply shut down, as the economy went into 
recession between 1929 and 1933, and it was the remaining (and higher productivity) 
facilities that supplied output as the economy recovered (Bresnahan and Raff, 1991).     
But the second and more important influence involved the maturing of a privately 
funded research and development system that had begun with Edison at Menlo Park and 
reached maturity during the 1930s.  Both R and D employment and spending soared 
during the Depression years, and as Margo (1991) has shown, scientists and engineers 
were largely protected from the risk of unemployment that fell so heavily on other job 
groups.    
Thus one must use a light touch in contextualizing trends in manufacturing TFP 
during the interwar period.  In the two decades after 1929, TFP growth in manufacturing 
was substantially lower and less uniform across two digit industries than it had been in 
the 1920s.  Nevertheless, by any standard of comparison other than that of the 1920s, 
TFP growth in manufacturing during the Depression years was world class. 
The 1941-1948 period saw manufacturing TFP growth become negative.  Above 
and beyond  war related plants owned and operated by the government, the federal 
government paid for more than $10 billion of new capital, most of it in manufacturing 
and most of it equipment, located in Government Owned Privately Operated (GOPO) 
facilities.  Although labor productivity rose modestly (.20 percent per year) as a 
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consequence of this capital deepening, TFP in the sector fell at an annualized rate of -.52 
percent per year (Field, 2007a) 
In contrast with the 1920s, productivity advance during the Depression years and, to 
an even greater extent, the postwar period, cannot be explained by focusing almost 
exclusively on manufacturing.  That said, prior advance in manufacturing helped set the 
stage for the golden age of U.S. productivity growth, a period of sustained growth in 
living standards that  W. W. Rostow (1960) called the age of high mass consumption.  To 
recapitulate:  The revolution in factory layout, design, and internal power distribution 
resulted in manufacturing TFP that was two thirds higher in 1929 than it had been in 
1919. The twelve Depression years (1929-41) saw a halving of the TFP growth rate in 
manufacturing, but this rate of advance was still far higher than rates obtained in any 
period of the twentieth century other than the 1920s.  It was fueled in part by the final 
stages of the electrification transition and by the elimination, in some cases permanently, 
of low productivity plants as output fell.  That by itself, however, would have been 
insufficient to produce 2.60 percent per year over twelve years.  An increasingly 
important ingredient was rising spending on R and D and rapid advances in science based 
manufacturing, with which such spending was associated.  During the war years the 
manufacturing sector benefited from, but was also bloated and distorted by, the increase 
in military procurement and the injection of GOPO capital. 
American manufacturing emerged from the war in an unprecedented position of 
world dominance.  Technical frontiers had been expanded by a host of new product and 
process innovations during the 1930s, and some of this potential had begun to be realized 
prior to the war.  In other cases, such as television, all of the development work had been 
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done pre-war and the product was poised for rapid exploitation with the ending of 
controls after V-J day.   Another illustration: all of the combat aircraft placed in service 
during the Second World War by the United States were already on the drawing boards at 
its outset (Galbraith, 1971, p. 18). 
With European and Japanese manufacturing hobbled by war damage, U.S. 
manufacturing faced extraordinary global opportunities in helping to rebuild foreign 
industries and in satisfying their domestic markets while this took place. Continued high 
levels of military spending during the Korean and Cold Wars meant a stream of direct 
orders for defense contractors and a stimulus to and stabilization of aggregate demand for 
the rest of the economy. 
This was the environment in which the manufacturing corporations described in 
Galbraith’s New Industrial State consolidated their distinguishing characteristics.  
Galbraith described them as islands of planned economy within an ostensibly market 
based system. Many corporations offered something equivalent to lifetime employment 
security.  Through marketing and planned obsolescence, the disruptive force of 
technological change, what Schumpeter called creative destruction, had largely been 
domesticated, at least for a time. Whereas large corporations had funded research leading 
to a number of important innovations during the 1930s, many critics now argued that 
these behemoths had become obstacles to transformative innovation, too concerned about 
devaluing rent yielding income streams from existing technologies.  Disruptions to the 
rank order of the largest U.S. industrial corporations during this quarter century were 
remarkably few.  And the overall rate of TFP growth within manufacturing fell by more 
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than a percentage point compared with the 1930s, and more than three and a half 
percentage points compared with the 1920s.   
The view of the quarter century following 1948 as one of more moderate innovative 
advance within manufacturing is consistent with the enumerations of basic innovations 
by Alfred Kleinknecht, Jacob Schmookler, and Gerhard Mensch.  All of these series 
show peaks in the 1930s, particularly its second half.  Kleinknecht’s analysis, which runs 
through 1969, shows a big peak in total and product innovations in the 1930s, although 
process innovations peak in the 1950s (Kleinknecht, 1969).  Schmookler’s data, which 
runs through 1959, shows a peak of 48 basic innovations in the 1935-39 period, 
dwindling to 0 in 1955-59 (Schmookler, 1966). 
The most recently updated Bureau of Labor Statistics data show that the rate of 
increase of TFP in manufacturing falling to 1.49 percent per year between 1949 and 
1973.   Kendrick and Grossman (1980) report that the calculated TFP growth rate in 
manufacturing measuring from 1948 to 1973 was 1 percent less than measuring 1949 to 
1973.  Making an allowance for this difference, one can use 1.48 percent per year as a 
rough estimate of TFP growth in the sector between 1948 and 1973.  This is 1.12 
percentage points lower than the rate experienced in the Depression years, and 3.6 
percentage points lower than the blistering pace realizing in the 1920s (see Field, 2006a).  
An important conclusion follows:  The golden age of American labor productivity growth 
was a phenomenon associated with generally decelerating TFP advance within 
manufacturing.   Since TFP growth in the private non-farm economy as a whole was 1.90 
percent per year over this period, it is obvious that other sectors of the economy had to 
have been experiencing TFP growth substantially higher than was manufacturing. 
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Here is one way of considering manufacturing’s diminishing contribution to TFP 
growth.  On average manufacturing constituted about a third (.339) of the private 
nonfarm economy over this period (see Table 1 below).  Suppose TFP growth in 
manufacturing had continued during the golden age at the same rates it had evidenced 
during the Depression years.  Using this hypothetical growth rate of 2.60 percent per year 
and the actual share of output, manufacturing would have contributed .881 percentage 
points to PNE TFP growth (.339*2.60).  In actuality, with TFP rising at 1.48 percent per 
year, it contributed .502 percentage points (.339*1.48), a difference of .38 percentage 
points. Everything else being equal, continued manufacturing sector TFP growth of 2.60 
percent per year would have boosted PNE TFP growth to 2.28 percentage points per year 
(1.90+.38), just shy of the record (unadjusted) rate experienced during the Depression 
years (2.31 percent per year).  Or, in other words, almost the entirety of the slowdown in 
PNE TFP growth, comparing the postwar period with the Depression years, can be 
attributed to the reduction in the growth rate in manufacturing. 
We can also consider the effect of declining TFP advance in manufacturing by 
looking at the share of PNE TFP growth accounted for by the sector.  Manufacturing 
accounted for only 26 percent of TFP advance in the PNE during the golden age 
(.502/1.90), as compared with 48 percent during the 1929-41 period (see Field 2006a).  
This decline was the result of a reduction in the sector’s share of output and its TFP 
growth rate. Had the share but not the sector growth rate decreased, manufacturing’s 
contribution would have fallen only from 48 percent to 39 percent of PNE TFP growth 
(.881/2.28). 
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 However we parse manufacturing’s contribution we are impelled to look elsewhere 
in the economy for a full understanding of trends and levels of productivity advance 
within the United States during the golden age. An obvious strategy is to examine 
sectoral TFP growth rates across the economy. Our analysis begins with two relatively 
solid numbers:  TFP growth for manufacturing and for the PNE as a whole, both 
obtainable from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Unfortunately, there is a large asymmetry 
in the attention government statistical agencies devote to manufacturing as compared 
with the rest of the economy, and this is particularly so for productivity data.  The Bureau 
of Labor Statistics publishes detailed information down to the 2 digit level on the growth 
of total factor productivity in the manufacturing sector from 1949 onwards.  The most 
detailed productivity data at the sectoral level are for manufacturing, and they show, as 
already noted, that between 1949 and 1973, TFP grew in the sector at a compound annual 
rate of 1.49 percent per year. As discussed above, I use 1.48 percent per year as the 
estimate for TFP growth in the sector between 1948 and 1973. 
1.48 percent is substantially below the rate of advance of 1.90 percent per year 
calculated by the BLS for the entire private nonfarm economy.  This means, as noted, that 
within the private nonfarm economy TFP advance outside of manufacturing had to be, on 
average, higher than it was within it.  The large scale bureaucratic corporations that 
dominated manufacturing, and were described in Galbraith’s The New Industrial State, 
generated rates of TFP advance that were historically modest by the standards of the 
1920s or the 1930s. 
As an approximation, the growth rate of overall TFP growth in the PNE will be a 
weighted average of sectoral TFP growth rates, the weights corresponding to the shares 
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of the sectors in PNE value added.  A good rule of thumb for the latter part of the 
twentieth century is that the PNE constituted three fourths of GDP.  For TFP calculations 
applicable to the PNE, the BLS excludes from GDP the value added of agriculture, 
general government, government enterprises, nonprofit institutions, paid employees of 
private households, and the rental value of owner-occupied dwellings. (BLS Handbook of 
Methods, ch. 10).  In Table 1 I sum the value added of agriculture, government, including 
government enterprises, educational institutions (almost all of which are private non-
profit; government funded schools and universities would already be excluded because 
they are part of general government), social services, and 2/3 of non-farm housing 
services.  These exclusions approximate a quarter of GDP in both 1948 and 1973, and in 
the calculations that follow, I will use 4/3, or 1.333, as the markup factor to convert a 
GDP share into a share of the PNE. 
Table 1 
GDP excluded from the Private Non-Farm Economy 
 
   
      
 1948 1973    
      
Agriculture 8.89 3.97    
Government (incl. gov enterprises) 11.17 14.77    
Educational Services 0.34 0.72    
Social Services 0.05 0.27    
2/3 of nonfarm housing services 3.03 4.67    
Private Households 0.88 0.35    
 24.36 24.75    
      
      
Source, Bureau of Economic Analysis,  Gross Product Originating by Industry 
      www.bea.gov       
 
Manufacturing’s share of value added was .278 in 1948 and .232 in 1973.  
Averaging these shares, we can conclude that manufacturing accounted for about a 
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quarter of GDP (25.5 percent) in the golden age, and about a third of the private non farm 
economy (25.5*1.33 = 33.9 percent).   Multiplying manufacturing’s weight – about one 
third -- by the sectoral TFP growth rate (.339 * 1.48) yields the sectoral percentage point 
contribution of .502 to the total PNE TFP growth of 1.90 percent.  Thus, as already noted,  
manufacturing was responsible for approximately 26 percent  of PNE TFP growth 
(.502/1.90) during the golden age.  This share can be compared with the 84 percent 
contributed between 1919 and 1929, and the 48 percent contribution between 1929 and 
1941. 
So, where is the remainder of TFP advance coming from during the golden age?  
Neither the BLS nor the BEA, unfortunately, readily provides detailed sectoral 
calculations outside of manufacturing.  There are two published sources that do, although 
they are not based on the latest revisions to the national accounts.   The first is by 
Kendrick and Grossman, published in 1980.  The second is a study by the American 
Productivity Institute cited in a 1982 paper by Nordhaus.  We will use these data (see 
Table 2) to examine relative productivity advance in the following subsectors of the PNE:  
Manufacturing, trade, public utilities, communication, transportation, construction, 
services, and FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate), keeping in mind that the absolute 
rates of growth are somewhat higher than a complete reworking of the numbers based on 
current revisions to the national accounts would likely suggest.  Both of these sets of 
estimates imply TFP growth in the PNE of about 2.2 percent per year, whereas the most 
recent BLS estimate has it at 1.90 percent.  
If we sum the shares of the six subsectors with higher TFP growth rates than 
manufacturing, they account for 43.9 percent of PNE, in comparison with the 33.6 
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percent attributable to manufacturing.  Using the Kendrick/Grossman data, a weighted 
average of the TFP growth rates of these six subsectors is 2.66, in comparison with 2.30 
for manufacturing.  Using the API data, the weighted average is 2.75, in comparison with 
2.2 percent for manufacturing.  A more definitive analysis awaits a full reworking of the 
sectoral estimates to bring them in line with the BLS’s most recent estimates for 
manufacturing and the PNE as a whole.  But if anything, this reworking should reinforce 
the point made here.  That is because the current BLS numbers show an even larger 




Sectoral TFP Growth Rates, United States, 1948-73 
 
 Share PNE, 1948-73 TFP Growth, 48-73 
Kendrick/Grossman 
TFP Growth, 48-73 
API/Nordhaus 
Communication .025 4.13 4.6 
Public Utilities .026 3.79 4.1 
Transportation .064 2.87 2.8 
Real Estate .063              2.74               2.8 
Mining .034 2.39 2.5 
Trade .227 2.33 2.4 
Manufacturing .336 2.30 2.2 
Services .122              1.70               1.8 
Construction .061  .91 1.2 
Finance, Insurance .042 .00 .2 
Sources:  Kendrick and Grossman, 1980; Nordhaus, 1982, p. 134. 
Note: Share of PNE is based on average of share of value added in 1948 and 1973, divided by .7593, the 
share of PNE in total value added.   
 
 
Most of the remainder of the discussion in this paper focuses on transportation and 
distribution, and particularly the implications of a several decades long transition from a 
surface system dominated by a rail/water division of labor, to one in which roads and to a 
lesser degree pipelines also played important roles.  According to Table 2, transport 
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accounted for an average of 6.4 percent of the PNE during the golden age.  But the 
significance of technological and structural change in the sector is broader because 
changes within it contributed to the ability of distribution (trade) and real estate to enjoy 
TFP growth rates above those experienced within manufacturing.  I have less to say here 
about the sectors generating the very highest rates of TFP growth: communications and 
public utilities, except that what is going on in these sectors also represented a 
continuation of trends already evident during the Depression years (see Field, 2003).  
Their direct contribution to TFP advance is smaller than that of transport or trade, 
because even though their rates of advance are higher, their shares in the economy are 
smaller.  
In understanding what forces outside of manufacturing are responsible for achieved 
productivity gains during the Golden Age, it is helpful to go back to the Depression years 
and consider them in relation to what transpired during the 1920s.  As previously noted, 
the TFP growth rate in manufacturing dropped by half, comparing 1919-29 with 1929-41.  
What picked up the slack and enabled the latter period to experience an unadjusted PNE 
TFP growth rate 15 percent higher than was registered in 1919-29?  The answer is to be 
found principally in transportation, communications, and public utilities, and to a lesser 
degree in wholesale and retail distribution (Field, 2003, 2006a).  Within this general area 
of non-manufacturing TFP advance, transportation was a standout. The very rapid build 
out of government funded highways during the Depression years played an important role 
in facilitating high TFP growth rates in such sectors as trucking and railroads (Field, 
2007a).  
Rails and Roads 
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Throughout the nineteenth century the construction and maintenance of roads had 
been, with a very few exceptions, a local responsibility.   With the exception of 
expenditures for Post roads, and the construction of the National Road, the involvement 
of the Federal government in the construction or improvement of highways was minimal 
prior to the passage of the Federal Aid Road Act (sometimes known as the Federal 
Highway Act) of July 11, 1916.  It was also in that year that the first trackage of the rail 
system reached its all time peak.  Although turnpikes had been built in the antebellum 
period (some private, some state supported), the extension of the railway network killed 
off most of this activity, and resulted in an almost complete division of labor between the 
provision of local transport by horse powered wagons traveling over mostly dirt roads 
and that of regional or interstate transport by steam powered vehicles moving over rail 
and water.  Aside from freight carried over water, longer distance and in particular 
interstate transport of both goods and passengers was conducted overwhelmingly by rail.   
The condition of American roads in the first decades of the twentieth century did 
not reflect the state of the technological art.  Other countries at comparable stages of 
development had intercity road networks that were far superior.  France, for example, had 
consistently devoted public resources to roads as well as rail and canals, and had also 
invested in and benefited from the skills of a superb cadre of highway engineers, 
graduates of the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées.  In the early 1920s U.S. farmers paid 21 
cents a ton mile to haul crops over dirt roads, whereas French farmers paid ten cents a ton 
mile to haul over paved roads.  Proponents of highway spending in the United States 
referred to this as a “mud tax,” arguing that it cost US farmers over $500 million per year 
(Goddard, 1994, p. 59). 
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The 1920s experienced a continuing and growing disjuncture between U.S. vehicle 
production and its surface infrastructure. Because of very rapid advance in manufacturing 
productivity, (see the first part of this paper), U.S. production and marketing of vehicles 
surged ahead of what was taking place in Europe, even though most of the underlying 
automotive technology had been perfected there.  By 1919, U.S. automobile registrations 
had already risen to 6.6 million, and there were 898 thousand trucks on the road.  These 
vehicles were used, however, almost exclusively for local travel.  
Trucks took advantage of the overburdened state of the railroads during the First 
World War to grab short haul business.  Urban firms welcomed trucks, which delivered 
door to door, obviating the necessity of running a horse and buggy down to the depot to 
pick up or drop off freight.  To the degree one could arrange point to point truck shipment 
thus bypassing the railroads entirely, businesses also found that breakage and wastage 
decreased because of the avoidance of intermodal transfer (Goddard, 1994, p. 87).  
But for interstate travel trucks still faced daunting challenges.   The state of the U.S. 
road network at the end of the First World War is reflected in the experience of a fleet of 
Army vehicles that attempted a cross country transit in 1919.  It took them 62 days, 
averaging about 50 miles a day.  If we assume they drove 10 hours a day, this is an 
average speed of about 5 miles an hour.  West of Kansas City, the roads were mostly dirt.  
Local roads outside of towns weren’t much better (Paxson, 1946, p. 244).2    
During the 1920s the fleets of cars and trucks continued to expand as their costs of 
production declined.  Between 1919 and 1929 automobile registrations more than tripled 
to 23.1 million, and truck registration surged by a factor of 4 to 3.5 million. Although the 
                                                 
2 In 1915 Emily Post, considering a cross country car trip across the United States asked a friend who had 
done it many times what was the best route across the United States.  Without hesitation the friend replied, 
The Union Pacific.  See http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/not2.pdf. 
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states and counties labored mightily to respond to the growing political demand for 
taxpayer financed road improvement, and the federal government began some revenue 
sharing to this end, without an agreement on which state highways would be part of a 
national system, interstate freight and passenger travel would be slow and uncertain at 
best, moving over roads of widely varying quality and capacity. 
Agreement among the states about which routes would be stitched together into a 
national system was brokered by the Federal government.  The 1921 Highway Act 
pledged that paved roads should link every county seat (Goddard, 1994, p. 91), but more 
importantly, insisted that states identify which 7 percent of its roads should be linked 
together into a national system. The politics of doing so were contentious, however, and 
the list of US routes was not finalized until November 11, 1926.  Although the Great 
Depression began less than three years later, its impact is scarcely evident in road 
construction figures.  Indeed, if one looked only at a series on such expenditures during 
the 1920s and 1930s, one would have no idea that the country experienced a severe 
economic downturn during the latter decade. 
Because of the lag between the surge in vehicle production in the 1920s and the 
catch up in infrastructure, it was primarily during the Depression years that the United 
States built its first national road network.  The expenditures that made this possible, 
which included projects administered by the Public Works Administration (1933-39) and 
the Works Progress Administration, have generally been interpreted as motivated by a 
Keynesian make work rationale, and that is sometimes how they were justified politically 
after the fact.  But these projects had very strong political support and a defensible 
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economic rationale, and they probably would have been undertaken (with a supply side 
rather than a make work justification) had the economy not headed south.   
In these respects they are somewhat analogous to the Bush administration tax cuts 
of 2001.  Those changes, which flowed disproportionate reductions in taxes to upper 
income households, were justified initially as a saving enhancing growth oriented 
program, but then repackaged in essentially unchanged form as a consumption enhancing 
Keynesian stimulus package when the economy went into recession.  The public road 
construction of the 1930s (an expenditure increasing rather than a tax reducing fiscal 
policy) had a less questionable supply side rationale.  Given the political agreement on 
the national route structure at the end of 1926 and the continued overhang of millions of 
new car and truck registrations, the U.S. probably would have gone forward with this 
construction whether or not the Great Depression had happened. 
During the twelve Depression years, the stock of street and highway capital in the 
country almost doubled (Field, 2003), and the interstate (small i) network whose outline 
had been agreed upon in 1926 was finished by the time the war began.  As Frederic 
Paxson wrote in 1946, “when the attack at Pearl Harbor drew the United States again into 
war, the highways were a completed operating mechanism, needing at the last minute 
little more than a detail act for access and strategic roads” (1946, p. 238).   The system of 
U.S. routes already enabled, prior to the Second World War, very substantial amounts of 
interstate ton mileage – almost 10 percent of the total - to be shipped by truck.   
Road building then effectively ceased for six years, resuming again with a full head 
of steam in 1947. The Interstate Highway System, launched subsequently by President 
Eisenhower, significantly expanded the capacity of the system, and changed some of its 
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qualities, but its routes were built alongside of or literally on top of those of an already 
completed US highway network.  Interstate 95, for example, which runs from Maine to 
Florida, roughly parallels US 1 that followed the same route; sections of several 
interstates have replaced US 66 that, as the song says, ran from Chicago to LA. In 1956, 
the year in which ground was broken on the Interstate system, trucks already carried 18 
percent of the ton mileage of interstate freight (up from 9.5 percent in 1940) (U.S. 
Statistical Abstract, 1964, p. 561).  In 1973, almost twenty years later, trucking’s share 
had risen by only another 5 percentage points.  
The outlines of the eventual truck/rail division of labor in carrying freight were not 
readily discernible in 1929, when trucks were probably responsible for less than 2 percent 
of interstate ton mileage.  But they were by 1941.  Postwar developments in surface 
transportation took place along lines that had been mapped out and essentially completed 
during the Depression.3 
At the end of the First World War virtually all interstate freight not carried over 
water moved by rail, and the rail/water division of labor that this reflected had been in 
place at least since the 1850s.  Just as the reconfiguration of American manufacturing in 
the 1920s represented a major departure from patterns that had prevailed for decades, so 
too did the transition in interstate shipments from a rail/water system to one that involved 
rail, road, water, and pipelines. That shift took off during the Depression and continued 
during the Golden Age.4 
                                                 
3 U.S. routes were, of course, built to substantially lower standards, with lower average speeds and 
capacities, than were the Interstates, controlled access divided highways that eschewed stop lights.  But the 
1941 system, essentially what the country had in 1956, represented an enormous improvement over what 
was in place in 1929.   
4 Public infastructural investment during the 1930s affected all four modes.  The US internal water 
transportation system, for example, also received substantial upgrades.  The Tennessee Valley Authority 
built dams which controlled floods and generated hydropower, but also improved river navigation.  
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This transition is part of the explanation for the high economy wide TFP growth 
rates that prevailed in the United States during the Depression years and the golden age.  
The growth of trucking’s share of interstate shipments from virtually nothing as late as 
the end of the 1920s to 18 percent in 1956 was predicated both on infrastructural capital 
accumulation and on a number of important technical advances which included the 
pneumatic tire and (more arguably) the internal combustion engine.  This complex of 
innovation and accumulation facilitated the development of a complementary and 
symbiotic relationship between a growing trucking industry and a pared down rail sector. 
A very substantial portion of this transition had already occurred by the time the 
first concrete for the Interstate highway system was poured.   That massive public works 
project helped extend the good times, at least for another decade.  But the mechanisms 
and magnitude of productivity advance in the transport/distribution sector in the postwar 
period represented continuation of trends and processes begun during the Depression.  
Both road and rail transport also experienced healthy productivity advance after the war. 
Remarkably, between 1948 and 1966, rail productivity rose even faster than it had during 
the Depression, and faster than productivity in the rest of the transportation sector. 
The shrinkage of the railway sector and the corresponding expansion of trucking in 
the golden age are vividly illustrated in the BEA’s persons employed series.  Railway 
employment dropped from 1.503 million to 565 thousand between 1948 and 1973, while 
employment in trucking expanded from 655 thousand to 1.303 million over the same 
period  (www.bea.gov, Table 6.8B, accessed Oct 26, 2004).  Between 1973 and 1989, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Elsewhere in the country, The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers improved navigation channels.  The 9 foot 
channel navigation project, for example, benefited river transport on 284 miles of the Upper Mississippi. 
Barge transport also benefited from the switch from tows to push barges.  But, in contrast with trucking and 
warehousing or railroads, TFP growth within water transport was very low across the Depression years (see 
Field, 2006a, Table 5). 
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while persons employed in railways dropped further to 262 thousand, trucking expanded 
to 1.546 million.  By 1989 there were as many people employed in trucking as there had 
been in railroads in 1948,  but less than half as many people employed in railroads as 
there had been in trucking at the earlier date. 
The role that highway construction played in influencing productivity in the U.S. 
rail industry is complex.  There is no question that (along with air transport) improved 
surface roads ultimately killed most of the rail passenger business, and that roads (along 
with pipelines) did the same for much of its freight business.  But it is also true that rail 
productivity increased sharply during the Depression years, in the presence of capital 
shallowing. It did so even more rapidly after the war in the context of capital deepening 
caused in part by a very rapid decline in labor input (see Kendrick and Grossman, 1980, 
p. 133).  And for several decades railroads remained part of a political coalition 
demanding federal support for the expansion of roads. 
Infrastructural investment during the Depression was an important contributor to 
TFP growth in the private economy (Field, 2006a,b; 2007a,b). Included here are 
investments in streets and highways, as well as the construction of tunnels and bridges 
particularly in such intermodal centers as the Bay Area and the New York metropolitan 
areas.  The coincident increase in output per hour is not simply a result of failing to 
include in measures of relevant private sector capital deepening the increased investments 
in highways.  The build out of the surface road network led to spillovers – network 
externalities and innovations in running rail systems and trucking operations – that 
boosted Depression era TFP growth, and continued to do so in the postwar period. 
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One might claim that the dominance of the 1929-41 period in TFP calculations is 
simply an accounting artifact resulting from the shift from privately owned rail 
permanent way to publicly owned streets and highways.  But this hypothesis is 
inconsistent with the data in Table 3, which recalculates PNE TFP growth using a capital 
input series that adds to private sector capital the value of the stock of government owned 
streets and highways  (the data are from the BEA’s Fixed Asset Tables).  It is true that 
adding in public capital growth makes a very significant difference in the growth of the 
augmented capital series between 1929 and 1941 – the largest difference of any of the 
periods examined.  But the dominance of the Depression years in terms of TFP growth 
remains unchanged. 
Table 3 
Effect of Including Components of Government Infrastructure on Calculations 
of TFP Growth, United States, 1919-2000 
 








1919-29 2.02  .17 1.85 
1929-41 2.31  .29 2.01 
1941-48 1.29 -.02 1.31 
1948-73 1.90  .13 1.77 
1973-89  .34 -.08  .42 
1989-2000  .78  .02  .80 
 
Sources:  Sources: Field, 2006a, Table 1; BEA Fixed Assets Table 2.1, 2.2, 7.1, 7.2.. 
Note: Government Infrastructure includes streets and highways (federal and state and local) and other 
government structures, which includes electric and gas facilities, transit systems, and airports. Capital 
share used in calculating change in capital contribution =. 31. For 1919-1929, I compare growth of fixed 
asset stocks with and without government infrastructure between 1925 and 1929. 
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Road improvements contributed to productivity growth in the trucking industry in a 
number of easily understood ways.  With paved roads stopping at the city’s edge, as they 
generally did in 1919, trucks faced a tough go of it if they ventured beyond, particularly 
in the winter and during the spring thaw.  Improved roads meant trucks could travel at 
higher average speeds and cover longer distances in a day. As routes got longer and 
trucking traffic grew, network externalities resulted in greater likelihoods that truckers 
could snag a backhaul, which increased capacity utilization and raised the productivity of 
both capital and labor.   
Quality improvements in the reliability and durability of trucks complemented 
improvements in the roads.  Perhaps the most important of these was the borrowing of the 
pneumatic tire from the bicycle industry. Indeed, one can make a case that the tire was a 
more important technological precondition for a successful truck industry than were 
advances in the internal combustion engine – since alternate power sources, such as 
steam, might have achieved comparable range and reliability had they received similar 
levels of research and development attention (Arthur, 1989).5  In the absence of the 
pneumatic tire, however, vibrations and shocks made any but short distances and low 
speeds unbearable for the driver.  Wear and tear on the vehicle as well as the driver was 
far greater, and there were higher costs in damaged freight and broken containers.  The 
problem of absorbing shocks transmitted from the road surface was more serious for 
trucks than cars because of the greater weights involved.   After more than a century, no 
serious alternative to the use of inflatable rubber tires for cushioning surface road 
transport has emerged. 
                                                 
5 A steam powered automobile one the first Los Angeles to Phoenix race in 1908 with an average speed of 
17.5 mph. See http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/not2c.htm. 
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The pneumatic tire was first used on bicycles in 1889.  Just as many automobile 
manufacturers benefited from their experience building bicycles, so to did political 
pressure from bicyclists for better paved roads lay the foundation for subsequent lobbying  
by automobile and truck interests towards the same end (Finch, 1992, pp. 24-25.).  The 
emerging political coalition for “good roads” brought together automobile and bicycle 
enthusiasts and a growing trucking industry with automobile, truck,  and tire 
manufacturers, road contractors, asphalt and cement producers, the petroleum industry, 
insurance companies and the motor lodging industry (Goddard, 1994, p. ix).    
There is a rapidly growing literature on the impact of general purpose technologies 
on economic growth.  Despite the efforts of Bresnahan and Trachtenberg (1995) and 
Lipsey, Bekar, and Carlaw (1998) to be more precise about its characteristics, there are 
good reasons for being skeptical that the concept adds a great deal to our toolkit (Field, 
2006b),  Nevertheless, there are clearly some innovations and innovation complexes that 
are more important than others.  A number of writers (Gordon, 2000, David and Wright, 
2003) have speculated about the “internal combustion engine” as a potential GPT.  
Careful consideration suggests that this new engine design was only part of a 
consequential innovation complex, and not necessarily its most important part. It is true 
that in the event the vast majority of vehicles on America’s highways were powered by 
gasoline or diesel engines in which combustion took place within rather than outside of 
cylinders.  But the particular design of the engine is not what was critical.  It was the use 
of self propelled vehicles on rubber tires running over a paved and improved 
infrastructure that was the key contributor to the second wave of TFP advance identified 
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here.  Whether these vehicles were powered by external combustion (steam), or gasoline 
fueled internal combustion engines was a matter of secondary importance. 
While it is clear how better roads benefited trucking, it is not so obvious that they 
promised and in fact yielded significant benefits to the rail industry.  How did improving 
the surface road network lead to complementary improvements in productivity in the 
railroad sector?   One important mechanism was by smoothing out seasonal fluctuations 
in the demand for freight cars.  Rural Free Delivery had brought mail and mail order 
goods to millions of farm households, and the insistence by the Post Office that roads be 
minimally passable in order to institute the service had resulted in some improvements in 
local roads and bridges.  But as late as the mid 1920s paved roads tended to end at the 
edges of towns and cities with the possible exception of major metropolitan centers on 
the two coasts.  Consequently shipments to and from rural households dropped 
precipitously when the roads were bad, particularly during the winter months and the 
spring thaw.  Prior to the railroad, freezing temperatures shut down interior commerce in 
much of the northeast and Midwest for as much as five months during which canals and 
rivers were impassable.  Railroads were largely unaffected by changing weather 
conditions, but they still relied on trucks or horse and buggies for the trip from depots to 
farm households.  These miles, dependent on a dirt roadbed, remained more vulnerable to 
the weather than had interregional canal and river traffic prior to the railroad. 
The flip side of the collapse of shipments during winter and spring months was that 
shippers deluged the railroads with business during the dry season.  Carriers had to 
balance the benefits of being able to meet this surge in demand with the costs of holding 
excess capacity the rest of the year.  As one might expect, their solution represented a 
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compromise, with the result that prior to road improvements and the growth of the 
trucking industry, railroad shipments were backlogged during four or  five months while 
many freight cars ran close to empty during the remainder of the year (Goddard, 1994, p. 
52).   
In the 1920s railroads could not imagine trucks making runs of more than 20 miles 
a day and they anticipated that better roads would smooth their shipment flow and they 
would enjoy a symbiotic relationship with the trucking industry in which they (the 
railroads) would enjoy the role of senior partner.  That was one reason for their support of 
the “good roads” movement for the better part of several decades.  Another was their 
expectation that they could earn money by shipping construction materials – asphalt and 
concrete - for new roads.  They cheerfully hauled the materials that would improve the 
highways, and they hauled the steel, glass, tires and subassemblies to Detroit, where the 
trucks and cars were built, and they hauled the completed trucks and cars from Midwest 
factories to retail markets around the country.  Slowly, shipment by shipment, they 
contributed to the building of a competitive transport mode that eventually took away 
most of their passenger business and much of their freight traffic.   
The railroad industry simply did not fully appreciate the extent to which the 
burgeoning trucking industry would eventually eat much of its lunch.  Conventional 
wisdom for several decades was that trucks helped railroads, they were the servants of 
railroads, because they either delivered from the depot to the final destination (where 
railroads could not).  Or, in cases where roads might parallel rails, the conventional 
wisdom was that trucks were suitable only for short hauls, on which railroads couldn’t 
make money anyway.  But entrepreneurial truckers had other ideas, pushing the edge of 
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the envelope to 50 miles, then 100, then even longer runs.  Low barriers to entry and the 
lack of regulation prior to 19356 created an environment in which the industry could 
grow rapidly in response to burgeoning profit opportunities made possible by 
improvements to the roadbed and to the durability, reliability, and size of trucks.   
The economics of trucking were fundamentally different from those of rail.   
Because railroad companies enjoyed decreasing average costs over much of their output 
range, the industry tended toward monopoly.  Pricing at marginal cost might be 
allocatively efficient but could not hope to cover fixed costs.   The consequence was a 
byzantine system of freight classes through which rail companies tried to price 
discriminate based on the value of the product being shipped rather than what it cost to 
move it.  Charging what the market would bear was a practical necessity if bankruptcy 
was to be avoided, but was arbitrary and inherently discriminatory.  Complaints about 
discrimination and political agitation against railroads led to the creation of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and a system of regulated prices. 
Truckers, who did not own their road bed or have to pay for it directly, had low 
fixed costs and faced cost structures more closely approximating the canonical 
competitive firm.  They did not have to segregate their freight into categories.  They 
charged by weight, and could respond to changing market condition by quickly adjusting 
rates, whereas railroads had to go through a complicated and time consuming 
administrative process to do so.  That was one reason why truckers were running circles 
around railroads, literally and figuratively. Another was that trucking had much greater 
flexibility in terms of changing routes and batching jobs to deal with geographically 
dispersed pickup and delivery, so that while rails struggled with increasing numbers of 
                                                 
6 The Federal Motor Carrier Act. 
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less then carload shipments, network externalities allowed truckers to increase their load 
factors. By 1940, 9.5 percent of interstate ton mileage was already carried by trucks.  
(Statistical Abstract, 1964, p. 561). 
Nevertheless, there remained much that was defensible in the railroad’s justification 
for supporting the construction of better roads.  Both labor productivity and TFP went up 
in the railroad sector faster during the 1929-41 period faster than they had between 1919 
and 1929, even though capital deepening occurred in the earlier period and capital 
shallowing (declines in the stock of both equipment and structures and declines in the 
overall ratio of capital to labor in the industry) took place during the Depression years 
(Field, 2003).   The total mileage of the railroads reached its high water mark in 1916, the 
year of the first Federal highway bill, but the shrinkage of trackage was slow in the 1920s 
and began to accelerate only during the 1930s.  Spurs to inactive mines were abandoned, 
and lightly used freight and passenger routes were increasingly abandoned as well.  To 
the degree that the rail system shut down its least productive activities, productivity went 
up.     
First track mileage operated for all reporting railways peaked at 266,381 miles at 
the end of 1916.  By 1929 this had dropped only marginally to 262,546.   By 1941, 
however, it had fallen to 245,240, about a 9 percent decline from the peak (US Statistical 
Abstract, 1942, p. 477.)   In 1973 it had fallen to 216,000 miles (US Statistical Abstract, 
1978, p. 660), as the industry continued to seek and receive permission to abandon 
unused or lightly used lines.   
Between 1929 and 1941 TFP advance in trucking and warehousing was nothing 
short of phenomenal, growing at a compound annual rate of 13.6 percent.  The sector was 
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responsible for almost 10 percent of the entire PNE TFP growth during this period.  TFP 
in railroads rose at 2.91 percent per year between 1929 and 1941.  Even though this was 
only a fifth of the blistering pace in trucking and warehousing, the substantially larger 
weight of rails in the economy meant that railroads accounted for about 6.5 percent of the 
2.31 percent per year TFP growth in the private nonfarm economy (again, this is in 
comparison with the 48 percent contributed by manufacturing; see Field 2006a for 
detailed calculations).  
By 1941, then, a significant reconfiguration of the US surface transportation system 
had already taken place.   The network of national routes that remains with us to this day, 
although subsequently expanded and paralleled by the Interstate system, was essentially 
complete.  The key infrastructural components (bridges and tunnels) for the major East 
and West Coast port complexes had been built.  Trucking was already responsible for 
close to 10 percent of interstate ton mileage, and the railroads had abandoned more than 
20,000 miles of first track. 
The historical trends that emerged during the Depression were temporarily 
interrupted by the Second World War, as the trucking sector shrank and railroads 
expanded in the face of wartime exigencies.  It was a triumphant period for the U.S. rail 
system, which performed far better than it had during the First World War, when, 
jammed with shipments from the industrial Midwest to East Coast ports, a railroad sector 
beaten down by a hostile public and tough ICC rate regulation had been ignominiously 
taken over by the government.  Trucking, on the other hand, had received something of a 
boost during the First World War.   Even though the roads were terrible, the U.S. was still 
the world’s largest petroleum producer and fuel availability was not a problem, so trucks 
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were able, heroically in some instances, to come through where the bottlenecked rail 
system could not.   
The situation was quite different during the Second World War.  Petroleum was 
scarcer. Fuel was now needed for thousands of aircraft, tanks, jeeps, and other military 
vehicles, since the scale of mechanized warfare far exceeded what had been true in the 
earlier war.  Truck tonnage shrunk, while rail tonnage expanded.  Because the war was 
fought on both a Pacific and a European front, freight (and passengers) moved both East 
and West, a situation that benefited rail performance by attenuating the backhaul problem 
that had plagued the system in 1917-18.  Both passenger and freight traffic hit record 
levels and the railroads made substantial profits, emerging from the war in better 
financial shape than they had enjoyed in more than two decades. 
After the war trends from the 1930s reasserted themselves.  Public infrastructural 
expenditure resumed, and, in conjunction with innovations such as piggybacking and 
containerization, continued to throw off spillovers in the transport and distribution sector.  
But it was now rail rather than trucking that experienced the highest rate of productivity 
growth.  TFP in the shrinking rail sector more than doubled between 1948 and 1966, 
growing at a compound annual rate of over 4 percent per year (Kendrick and Grossman, 
1980, p. 133).  
A growing contributor to productivity advance in the transport sector in the postwar 
period was innovation in intermodal transfer, particularly piggybacking and 
containerization.   Piggybacking involved placing the trailer part of a tractor trailer on a 
flatbed railcar, shipping it over long distances, and then reconnecting it a truck to be 
taken to its final destination.  In 1958 about 1 percent of railway car loadings (278,081) 
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were piggybacked trailers.  By 1986 that share had risen to 15 percent (Duke et. al., 1992, 
pp. 52-53). Containerization, launched in 1956 in the ocean borne freight industry, 
expanded rapidly during the 1960s, and even more rapidly thereafter.  The development 
of a standard sized container, carriers built to accommodate them, and transshipment 
facilities that could quickly handle them meant dramatically reduced labor and capital 
costs associated with transfers between water, road, and rail. 
For the railroads and trucking industries, containerization represented a more 
flexible generalization of the principle of piggybacking.  Some commodities, such as 
coal, oil, grain, or iron ore, remain best suited, whether shipped over water or rails, to 
specialized bulk carriers.  And some other types of cargo continue to be shipped in the 
breakbulk portion of the industry.   But for a wide range of general freight, the innovation 
of a standard sized container (originally 20’ x 8.5’ x 8.5’; now usually 40 feet long) that 
could be stacked on a ship, a railcar, or the back of a tractor trailer, dramatically cut the 
costs and time required to effectuate transfers.  
Containerization began in 1956 when the Sealand Corporation ran a modified 
tanker stuffed with containers from New York to Houston. It took off in the 1960s, as 
new port facilities were built in places such as Port Elizabeth, New Jersey, Oakland, 
California and, in Europe, Rotterdam.  Although originally developed to reduce 
turnaround time and labor costs in loading and unloading ships, containerization rapidly 
evolved to the point where it could equally well facilitate road to rail transfers (or vice 
versa).  Containerization and its predecessor, piggybacking, represented an important part 
of the evolving symbiosis between railways and the trucking industry. 
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As Wilfred Owen observed back in 1962, the innovation saved both labor and 
capital (Owen, 1962, p. 410).  The labor saving was obvious: less hours required to break 
or transship cargo. And although containerization required investments in both structures 
and equipment, capital saving resulted from increases in the rate of throughput, meaning 
faster rates of inventory turn and higher utilization rates on fixed capital (see Field, 
1987).  In terms of its contribution to private nonfarm economy TFP growth during the 
golden age, containerization was probably more important than any single innovation 
coming out of the manufacturing sector during this period. 
The End of the Golden Age 
A full understanding of the post 1973 productivity slowdown, a global 
phenomenon, has eluded the best efforts of a large number of economists.  But just as our 
understanding of economic growth in the golden age benefits from a study of its roots in 
the Depression years, so too does the study of the productivity slowdown after 1973 
benefit from a search for the sources of advance in the golden age. Growth in TFP began 
to slow in many sectors after 1966 and dropped precipitously after 1973.  The slowing in 
TFP growth, the major cause of the retardation in growth in output per hour, coincides 
with a tapering off of gains from a one time reconfiguration of the surface freight system 
in the United States. After declining sharply for decades, the share of rails in intercity ton 
mileage stabilized after 1973 in the 37 percent range, actually rising slightly in the 1990s 
(the 2000 figure was 41 percent).  This stabilization, in turn, coincided roughly with the 
completion of the Interstate Highway system.   
Productivity advance in transportation did not cease after 1973.  Although progress 
was weak in all modes in the 1970s, it came back strongly in rail and air transport in the 
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1980s and 1990s.  Rail productivity benefited from changes in work rules that eliminated 
cabooses and reduced manpower requirements.  Crews on intercity trains dropped from 
four or five to two people. Electronic sensors rather than humans now warned of 
avalanche slides or highwater flows over bridges.  Computer assisted dispatching 
combined with track sensors and other electronic devices reduced labor requirements in 
marshalling yards. The 1980 Staggers Rail Act made it easier for lines to abandon lightly 
used track and to merge.  Mergers, in turn, allowed more intensive utilization of 
consolidated and shared facilities (Duke et al, 1992, pp. 52-53).   
Railroads became highly specialized and highly productive “pipelines” for coal, 
grain, chemicals and even the movement of new vehicles, a business they now recaptured 
to a significant degree from trucks.  They rounded out their portfolio with containerized 
shipments, which grew dramatically in the last third of the century.  Railroads initially 
opposed containerization, but they ultimately appear to have benefited from it more than 
did trucking.   One of trucking’s big early advantages over rails had been that it could 
offer point to point transit, without the need for breaks in cargo.  Because the use of 
standardized containers reduced the cost and time required for transfers, rails could now 
recapture some of this business. Rails also benefited from periods of high energy costs, in 
a manner somewhat analogous to what had happened during the Second World War.  
Railroads are more energy efficient in carrying freight long distances; higher energy costs 
also increased the demand for coal shipments, rarely carried by truck. 
Although productivity growth in trucking eventually revived after the doldrums of 
the 1970s, the glory days were behind it.  The sector could no longer anticipate spillovers 
from infrastructure enhancement, as it had to such an extraordinary degree in the 1930s.  
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Just as the unprecedented TFP gains in manufacturing slowed as the share of electrified 
manufacturing approached 80 percent at the end of the 1920s, so too did the surface road 
spillovers within transportation slow as the capacity enhancements of the road net were 
completed in the early 1970s.  After 1973, productivity growth in trucking slumped. 
Productivity growth in airlines and railways, on the other hand, revived at a strong pace 
during the 1980s (Baily and Gordon, 1988, p. 419).   
 
Table 4 
Sectoral TFP Growth Rates, United States, 1948-66 and 1966-73 
 
 TFP Growth, 48-66 
Kendrick/Grossman 
TFP Growth, 66-73 
Kendrick/Grossman 
Share PNE, 1948-73 
Communication 4.62 2.84 .025 
Public Utilities 4.79 1.24 .026 
Transportation 2.99 2.08 .064 
Real Estate 3.32 1.26 .063 
Mining 3.20 .32 .034 
Trade 2.44 2.04 .227 
Manufacturing 2.46 1.89 .336 
Services              1.50 2.20 .122 
Construction 2.46 -3.10 .061 
Finance, Insurance .40 -.88 .042 
At least through the 1960s, highway construction was, on balance, beneficial to the 
U.S. standard of living.  For several decades spillovers and network externalities 
outweighed any tendency toward diminishing returns.  This does not mean, however, that 
such a result could necessarily continue indefinitely.  There are  grounds for questioning 
both the social and economic benefits of the final stages of the building of the Interstate 
system, which rammed freeways into the heart of central business districts, reducing the 
urban tax base as they destroyed often viable neighborhoods, and contributing to the 
decay of inner cities.  These projects were extraordinarily expensive on a per mile basis, 
and improved road access to a core whose economic viability was simultaneously being 
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eroded by the construction projects themselves.  It has taken several decades to 
reconfigure urban areas to adjust to these shocks (in some cases more successfully than 
elsewhere), with renewed investments in mass transit and reintroduction of light rail 
technologies abandoned several decades earlier. 
With the exception of services, there was an across the board decline in TFP growth 
rates, comparing 1966-1973 with 1948-1966, presaging decleration over the 1973-89 
period, which experienced the worst (peak to peak) productivity growth in the twentieth 
century.  Most students of the productivity slowdown (Abramovitz was an exception) 
dated it from 1973, but as the above data show, the deceleration began earlier.  The 
emphasis on 1973 led to a lot of early work on the role of the oil shocks of 1973-74 and 
1979, and oil retains appeal as the one obvious explanation for the global character of the 
slowdown.  But real oil prices collapsed in the 1980s, and productivity growth remained 
slow through the remainder of the decade.   
Within the United States, Vietnam and the malaise and discontent – as well as 
dislocations of the economy -- with which it was associated perhaps played a role.  But a 
more concrete influence was the end of the era of large private sector spillovers from 
government funded highways programs.  Whether higher levels of infrastructural 
spending following the completion of the interstate highway system could have 
forestalled lower productivity growth rates on this account, and if so, by how much, is an 
open and much debated question.  
In accounting for the decline in PNE TFP growth following 1973, some attention 
should also be paid to the continued decline in TFP growth within manufacturing 
compared with the golden age.  TFP growth in manufacturing dropped from 1.48 percent 
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per year (1948-73) to .57 percent per year between 1973 and 1989 (BLS data). Over the 
same period TFP in the private nonfarm economy declined from 1.90 percent per year to 
.34 percent a year, a stunning drop of 1.56 percentage points.  How much of this can be 
attributed to the slowed rate of growth of TFP in manufacturing?  Manufacturing’s share 
of value added declined after the Second World War, dramatically so after 1973.   
Averaging beginning (.2324) and end point (.1843) share, we have a manufacturing 
share of .2084 of value added over the 1973-89 period, thus a manufacturing share of 
about .277 of the PNE.  Had TFP growth within manufacturing persisted at the 1948-73 
rate of 1.48 percent per year, we would have had a contribution from manufacturing to 
PNE TFP growth 1973-89 of .41 percentage points a year (.277*1.48), instead of the .16 
percentage points (.277*.57) actually contributed.  The difference represents 
manufacturing’s contribution to the collapse of PNE TFP growth:  .25 percentage points 
per year.   
But since PNE TFP growth declined, comparing the two periods, by 1.56 
percentage points, manufacturing can account for at best a sixth of the slowdown.  As has 
been noted, there is a general and persistent downward trend in TFP growth within 
manufacturing from its peak during the 1920s.  Some of the retardation, which is already 
evident in the last years of the golden age and continued during the 1973-89 period, may 
be associated with the slowdown in non defense R and D spending that is apparent 
starting in the 1960s and continuing in the 1970s (see Rosenberg and Mowery, 2001).  
But whatever its causes, only a small fraction of the slowdown in the economy as a whole 
after 1973 can be attributed directly to productivity slowdown within manufacturing.  
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The remainder has to be originating elsewhere, and a prime candidate is the 
retardation in productivity advance in transport/distribution coincident upon the 
exhaustion of the extraordinary productivity advances made possible by the shift from 
rail to truck that had begun in the late 1920s.  The rough post-1973 stability of road/rail 
shares in intercity ton mileage, after four decades in which trucking had risen at the 
expense of rails, testifies powerfully to the coming to the end of a transition comparable 
in significance to the electrification of U.S. manufacturing.  
Fernald (1999) provides data which supports this interpretation.  He finds a close 
correlation between road construction and changes in productivity in vehicle intensive 
sectors, such as transportation and trade.  Prior to 1973, productivity growth in those 
sectors was higher than the economy wide average.  Subsequent to 1973, when the U.S. 
street and highway capital stock essentially stopped growing, the reverse was true.  
Fernald also finds that, at the margin, highway construction does not appear to be 
unusually productive.   Thus he concludes that “Road building…explains much of the 
productivity slowdown through a one time, unrepeatable productivity boost in the 1950s 
and 1960s” (Fernald, 1999, p. 619).  His argument supports my analysis, although 
because his statistical work is limited to the second half of the century,  he is not able 
fully to appreciate the extent to which advances in the golden age represented a 
continuation of trends first manifested in the 1930s. 
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005) attribute the end of the golden age to the first stages 
of the IT revolution, arguing that when one has a transformative technology, productivity 
growth must first deteriorate before it can improve. The logic involves transition and the 
reality that users often don’t initially know how best to take advantage of a new 
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technology.  But while their argument is theoretically coherent, it is empirically 
implausible.  
In the late 1960s, when the slowdown began in the United States, the use of 
mainframe computers for accounting and billing and time shared systems for airline 
reservations were already well established, whereas the disruptive effects of personal 
computers and the internet were still decades away.  In 1966 the current cost value of IT 
equipment and software was just 2.5 percent of private fixed assets and 3.1 percent of the 
total in 1973.  Another perspective:  The real stock of IT capital in 1966 stood at just 3.25 
percent of its value in 2000 (the latter calculation is based on chain type quantity indexes 
of the net stock; see Bureau of Economic Analysis, Fixed Asset Tables 2.1 and 2.2).  
At the time the productivity slowdown began, the uses of IT capital were limited, 
relatively well established, and concentrated in a few sectors. The slowdown in 
productivity advance was significantly broader.  Without a more detailed explication of 
exactly how and where IT investments were responsible for the slowdown, it is difficult 
to give the hypothesis much credence. The exhaustion of the gains from the second 
transition emphasized in this paper – from a rail/water duopoly in surface transport to the 
new modality of road/rail/water/pipelines is a more promising candidate in helping us 
understand the decline in growth in both TFP and output per hour after 1973.  
It should be emphasized that there is no inconsistency in arguing that government 
infrastructural investments in the four decades running from the late 1920s to the mid-
1960s had important spillover effects that show up in economy wide PNE, and at the 
same time remaining agnostic or skeptical about whether additional infrastructural 
spending would have forestalled the decline.  Thus it may be misleading to suggest that 
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the slowdown after 1973 is principally attributable to the demonstrable decrease in such  
spending (Aschauer, 1989).  It is more plausible to argue that the slowdown was a 
justified response to the reduced potential for incremental gains from additional 
investment. The logic here is similar to the argument made with respect to factory 
electrification/redesign.  Another example.  The 1930s were a great age of bridge, hydro, 
and tunnel construction.  The Golden Gate, Oakland Bay, and George Washington 
bridges and Lincoln Tunnel are a few famous examples from the two coasts.  The last 
major suspension bridge built in the United States crossed the Verrazanno Narrows, and 
was completed in 1964.   But that does not mean that U.S. productivity growth would 
necessarily have been higher had bridge construction continued at the same rate into the 
1970s and 1980s. 
Conclusions 
Students of the history of total factor productivity in the United States have noted 
that it grew fastest in a period spanning the fourth through seventh decades of the 
twentieth century (Abramovitz and David, 2001; Gordon 1999).  Gordon has referred to 
this acceleration as “One Big Wave” although the analogy is not entirely apt, since it is 
an unusual wave that leaves the water level permanently higher after it has passed.  
Whatever we call it, the phenomenon is real and we would like to understand better what 
underlies it.   
This paper can be thought of as tale of two transitions. The first involved the 
electrification and reconfiguration of the American factory, a development that had its 
roots in the 1880s but blossomed only in the 1920s, producing enormously high rates of 
TFP growth in manufacturing during that decade.  Rates in that sector trended generally 
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downward for the remainder of the century. The second transition, involving the 
movement of goods, peaked later.  From the late 1920s to the early 1970s, trucking 
expanded its share of interstate ton mileage, while the rail sector shrunk, specializing as it 
did so.    
Within the four decade period identified above, the strongest TFP growth occurs 
across the Depression years (1929-41), with performance in the quarter century after 
1948 a runner up (Field, 2003).  This paper has tried to explain both why TFP growth 
during the golden age was relatively strong and also why it was lower than it was during 
the Depression.  The downward trend in TFP growth within manufacturing, and its 
declining share after World War II, provide some answers to the latter question, but also 
forces us to look further a field in answering the former. 
As we step back from the subperiods, and consider the 1929-73 years as a long 
swing characterized by exceptionally high TFP growth, we should appreciate the extent 
to which developments in the postwar period – both the declining influence of advance 
within manufacturing (compared especially with the 1920s) and the significance of the 
continued transition within transport and distribution -- reflect the extension of trends 
already evident during the interwar years.  In doing so, we can move beyond the 
inclination to treat the golden age sui generis, and see within it the unfolding of 
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